Summary:

In March, Tunisia took multiple steps toward deepening ties with Russia in a move that risks greater skepticism from the European benefactors upon which Tunisia relies for economic support.

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In mid-March, Tunisia’s Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) signed a cooperation agreement with Russian on election monitoring. The President of the ISIE subsequently travelled to Russia to observe the landslide election victory of President Vladimir Putin, which the US Department of State called “undemocratic” due to the repression of “virtually all genuine political opposition.”

In late March, flagship Russian airline carrier Aeroflot announced plans to launch flights to Djerba and Enfidha in preparation for the upcoming tourist season. A similar announcement was made in early 2023, but did not come to fruition during the 2023 tourist season.

The March developments follow a September 2023 visit by Tunisian Foreign Minister Nabil Ammar to Moscow and a December 2023 visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Tunis.

Outlook: 

As Tunisia continues to take a largely non-aligned approach to diplomacy, a warming of diplomatic ties is a natural development, particularly given Tunisia’s need to source grains for import in light of flagging domestic production.

Additionally, faced with various sources of pressure, it is advantageous for Tunisia to maintain a variety of partners to which it can turn.

For now, Tunisia’s Western partners appear resigned to tolerate warming relations with Moscow, particularly given Tunisia’s dependence on tourism to support the economy. As Russian tourists find fewer countries open to receiving their tourists due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, Tunisia is positioned to seize some of Russia’s tourism market.

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